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I.  Introduction  
 
According to standard tax competition literature, tax competition among countries leads to an 
inefficiently low level of taxation. Taxes levied by one country impose spillover costs on 
other countries, if there are any migration externalities at work caused by  mobile factors 
(Zodrow/Mieszkowski, 1986; Wildasin, 1989). A tax base flight into low-tax countries is seen 
as forcing all governments to choose lower tax rates on mobile factors than their competitors. 
As  a  consequence,  they  engage  in  inefficient  competition  for  mobile  factors.  The  tax 
competition is reduced to a “race to the bottom” of the tax rates. This “race to the bottom” is 
self-reinforcing, because the individual share of the production costs of local public goods 
decreases with the amount of taxed factor income. Hence, each country that has a larger tax 
base than other countries is likely to attract more and more of the mobile factor, so being able 
to reduce its tax rates even further. In these circumstances, a suitable tax harmonisation must 
result in a pareto-improvement. The underlying conditions of the standard model, however, 
completely ignore the existence of agglomeration forces and trade costs. The tax competition 
among countries usually takes the form of a competition to attract industries. Agglomeration 
forces are important in this respect. There is a new and emerging literature dealing with tax 
competition implemented in a world full of agglomeration effects (Ludema/Wooton (2000); 
Baldwin/Krugman  (2004);  Bork/Pflüger  (2004).  These  agglomeration  models  are  able  to 
analyse the differences between cases where tax harmonisation is pareto-improving and where 
it is not. 
 
Based  on  the  new  literature,  this  article  depicts  the  case  of  Germany  today.  Germany‘s 
convergence process after reunification seems to have met an untimely end. Germany is in 
great danger of becoming a core-periphery world with a richer West and a poorer and emptier 
East. The aim of this contribution is to show that the same tax rates in the West and the East 
are disadvantageous at least for the East. Different tax rates in the West and the East will not 
result in a race to the bottom as the traditional literature fears, but they can improve the 
situation particularly for the East. 
 
This non-standard outcome, compared to the traditional literature, is dependent on whether 
there  are  agglomeration  forces  at  work  or  not.  This  underlines  the  importance  of 
understanding how the process of locating production and consumption in Germany is going 
on. Generally, agglomeration can be caused both by technological and pecuniary externalities.  
   
However, technological spillovers – often considered to be more important in the case of 
agglomeration inside one nation – are not the point to be focused on here. It is not the aim to 
analyse whether there are successful industries and which they are, and how to attract them. 
For implementing a tax that does not discriminate between different kinds of industry, it is 
required to concentrate on the pecuniary externalities only. For this reason, we turn to a model 
developed on the basic ideas of Krugman (1991). 
 
Pecuniary externalities are usually considered not to cause market failure and welfare losses. 
Although  some  authors  suggest  that  a  clustering  of  industries  driven  by  the  share  of 
expenditure and not by the share of persons represents a market failure (Baldwin et al. 2003), 
this does not seem to be completely convincing, because the reasoning relies only on a slight 
redefinition of market failure. The focus chosen here is therefore not on taxes as an instrument 
to correct the market results in order to achieve market efficiency. If Western Germany is 
large enough and all persons are mobile enough, it might be the optimum solution to allow for 
a  crowded  West  and  an  empty  East,  and  worth  considering  at  the  federal  level  of  the 
government to accept this result politically. Nonetheless, it is the aim here to focus on how a 
region (or a Bundesland) in the East can work against that. 
 
Firstly, the basic model of the agglomeration process driven by the migration of skilled labour 
is  described  relying  on  a  model  developed  by  Forslid/Ottaviano  (2003)  as  it  is  used  in 
Baldwin/Krugman (2004), but enriching this model with restrictions concerning the mobility 
of skilled labour (Chapter II). Then the convergence progress in Germany is observed in order 
to make sure that there is a need for taking up the ideas of the New Economic Geography, 
particularly  of  the  chosen  model.  For  this  it  will  be  examined  whether  there  is  enough 
mobility, who is moving and in which direction (Chapter III). Chapter III also depicts the 
partial  agglomeration  of  the  German  case.  Furthermore  (in  Chapter  IV),  we  are  adding 
different tax rates on income in West and East. We show what would happen if the East were 
free to set its own tax rates. We also discuss the “race to the bottom” problem for Germany 
briefly. Finally, we review our main results and give some advice for German policy to fight 
the agglomeration process (Chapter V). 
 
II.  The Basic Model 
  
   
The  basic  model  contains  the  two  German  regions,  two  sectors  and  two  factors.  At  the 
beginning, both regions are assumed to be identical in size and factor amount
1. The two 
factors  of  production  are  denoted  as  creative  human  capital  (H)  and  workers  (L)
2.  L  is 
assumed to be a homogeneous factor earning the wage  L w .  The two sectors of the model are 
called  A-Sector  and  M-Sector.  The  A-Sector  produces  homogeneous  goods  under  the 
conditions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Only a certain proportion of 
A a of L is used to produce one unit of the goods regardless of the output level. There are no 
innovations  in  A.  The  profit  made  equals  zero.  The  price  of  the  A-goods  is  given  by 
A L A a w p = . 
 
In the M-Sector, a multitude of diversified goods is produced under monopolistic competition 
with increasing returns in production. This part of the industry is the innovative one, in which 
creative human capital can earn high profits. The products of the M-Sector are heterogeneous, 
each firm produces a variant of its own. Therefore, it is possible to yield a positive profit after 
paying the wage for L. This profit is earned by the creative human capital. To make things 
simple it can be assumed that each enterprise is employing exactly one unit of creative human 
capital. The production of x units of a variety of M involves just one unit of H and  x aM units 
of L. The price for the input of this human capital is modelled as an amount of fixed costs w. 
Hence, it is the direct wage of H in the M-Sector. The total costs for producing x units of one 
heterogeneous good  are given by  x a w w M L + . 
 
The representative German consumer has two-tier preferences expressed in: 
(1) 
m m - =
1
A MC C U , 
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1 Neither the territory nor the density of inhabitants in Western and Eastern Germany is of equal size, but this 
should be interpreted partly as a result of the already ongoing agglomeration. Furthermore, some regions of the 
West attract many people while the number of immigrants into other Western regions is negligible. This makes it 
problematic to assume that the attracting regions in the West are larger (or smaller) than the sending regions in 
the East. Hence, it is more suitable to consider two regions of the same size. We further assume them to be 
symmetric in terms of tastes for goods, technology, trade costs and factor endowments. By assuming the East to 
have an older technology and less capital, this would even foster agglomeration towards the West making our 
arguments stronger. Note that the assumption of asymmetric size with a smaller East leads to agglomeration as 
well, and compare Baldwin et al. (2003) for a brief description. 
2 Baldwin et al. (2003) call factor H “entrepreneurs”, but this term is not to be used here. There are many 
entrepreneurs in Germany having nothing in common with the special factor that is needed to be successful in 
supplying heterogeneous goods. Their entrepreneurship is often caused by governmental help only – such as by 
the so-called “Ich AG” – (Sternberg/Lückgen, 2005). Such entrepreneurs are not the factor H.  
   
where M C  is the aggregated consumption of the varieties of M, and  A C  is the consumption of 
A-goods. n is the number (technically speaking, the mass) of  varieties i produced in the West, 
n* is the one produced in the East. We choose units of the mobile factor H such that its whole 
amount in Germany equals 1. Assuming one mobile factor per each firm, the number (mass) 
of  German  firms  is  a  numeraire  as  well  ( 1 * = + n n )
3.  s   is  the  constant  elasticity  of 
substitution between M-varieties, m  is the share of expenditure for M-goods. 
 
The indirect utility of a western owner of H is w, the one of a worker is  L w , with 
(2)  p w/ = w  ,  p wL L / = w . 
 
Both expressions have their counterparts in the East.  p is the price index (dependent on the 


















i A di p p p . 
 
Because of the product heterogeneity, one can observe the usual trade-off between economies 
of scale and product diversity. Trade in A-goods is free (we assume that they are easy to 
obtain due to their homogeneity), but trade in M-goods is inhibited by iceberg trade costs. For 
selling one unit in the other part of Germany, a firm must send  1 > t units.  1 - t  units of the 
goods melt on their way. 
 
Not only the goods can be traded, but also the creative human capital is able to change its 
region.  Following the assumption of equal regional size, the share of labour-force is given by 
5 . 0 * = = L L s s  in both the West and the East. Assume L to be immobile and H to be mobile 
between East and West
4. The whole amount of H is chosen as numeraire as well. However, 
the spatial allocation of H is endogenous. If the indirect utility of one unit creative human 
capital in one region is higher than in the other one, there is an incentive to move into this 
region. 
 
                                                 
3 See Baldwin et al. (2003) for the structure of the model and the choice of numeraires. 
4 L can also be assumed to be mobile. Under this assumption there would be no immobile factor, which can 
cause a total agglomeration of all factors. Having no other persons in our model, this excludes the problem. Note 
that  the  agglomeration  of  H  is  just  a  problem  for  the  immobile  persons  in  the  East.  An  additional  partial 
emigration of L would make the problem even worse for the people who are still staying in the East.  
   
Most of the contributions to the New Economic Geography consider the mobile factor to be 
perfectly mobile. In reality, you will not find this perfect mobility. But just this assumption is 
responsible for the corner-solutions of complete agglomeration in most of the models. These 
models may give a good idea of how the agglomeration process is running, but they are not 
suited to depict reality and to show how different tax rates will work. This is the reason why it 
is necessary to enrich the model with partial mobility of the H-factor. Our mobile creative 
human capital H is only changing its region when the utility-win outweighs the mobility 
costs. 
 
The mobility costs f of H are described by the share of H in one region and the parameter  l  
(giving the home preferences): 
(4) 
2 ) 5 . 0 ( - = H H s f l ,  0 > l  for  5 . 0 ³ H s   and  
2 ) 5 . 0 ( - - = H H s f l ,  0 > l  for  5 . 0 £ H s . 
 
H s  is the share of creative human capital in the West. We grade the creative ones by their 
willingness to leave the country. Starting at  5 . 0 = H s , the first person who is changing region 
is someone who is almost indifferent in his decision to move or to stay.  His mobility costs (or 
his  home  preferences)  are  negligible.  But  as  more  and  more  people  go,  more  and  more 
persons with stronger preferences for staying have to leave the region. The individual costs of 
migrating (or leaving the preferred home region) are growing (see the dashed line in the 
following figure 1). 
 
A short- and a long-run equilibrium are to be distinguished. In describing the first one, we 
take  the  spatial  allocation  of  H  as  exogenous.  The  price  of  A-goods  is 
* * A L A A L A a w p a w p = = =  due to perfect competition in West and East and the non-existence 
of trade costs. Additionally we have to assume that there is no full specialisation of one region 
(both regions always produce A-goods; m  is sufficiently low)
5. Germany-wide demand for A 
is given by  A A p E E C / *) )( 1 ( + - = m . E is the expenditure of the people in the West, E* the 
one of those in the East. 
      
A constant share m  is spent on M-goods, so one can build a demand function for a variety of 
one M-goods**. Having assumed iceberg costs, for a monopolistic competitor mill-pricing is 
optimal, and the consumer prices for a western variety in the West and East are given by:   
                                                 
5 See Baldwin et al. (2003) for describing the NFS-condition.  
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For a given  H s  (in the short run) the reward of one unit creative human capital (its nominal 


























































* E E E
W + =  is the expenditure of the whole of Germany. The already known m  and s  give 
an idea of how much is spent on one variety of M.  * n n n
W + =  is the number (mass) of 
varieties of M-goods in the whole of Germany. More firms means more competition, thus 
making the reward of one firm (one H) smaller. The reward also depends on the share of 
expenditure in each region ( E s  and  E s - 1 ), the share of the mobile factor H (also meaning the 
share of firms) ( H s and  H s - 1 ), and a variable  j .  j  is a mnemonic for the “freeness” of 
trade, it is given by 
s t j
- =
1  and  1 0 £ £ j . A rising j means that trade is getting freer. 
 
There is one other relationship between  H s  and  E s  (the „market size condition“). By moving 



































gives the influence from changing  H s .  
 
This connection between  H s  and  E s  is one of the main differences in the New Economic 
Geography between the models with mobile people (the “so-called entrepreneur”) and the 
ones  with  mobile  capital,  where  the  profits  of  the  mobile  factor  are  repatriated  (and  the 
connection above does not exist). We want to observe the case of emigration from Eastern 
Germany, so we cannot take a footloose capital model with repatriated profits
6. However, it is 
                                                 
6 See for example Martin/Rogers (1995).  
   
politically unthinkable for Germany to accept that one region is significantly poorer than the 
other one. When looking at the German interregional redistribution, we have to add a further 
assumption to our model. We assume that the connection between  H s  and  E s  does exist, but 
that a share of expenditure  4 . 0 * < E s  in the East will not be accepted and will be corrected by 
redistribution. We further assume that this redistribution does not influence the agglomeration 
process in any other way than via expenditure. This should be realistic due to the fact that a 
large percentage of the transfers are made inside the social security systems. It is not their 
purpose to influence the agglomeration process. 
 
A few normalisations are already made.  We  are further allowed to assume  1 = M p  (thus 
following  t = * M p ),  1 * * = = = = L L A A w w p p   and  1 =
W E .  Remember  that  1 * = + n n , 




The indirect utilities in East and West are allowed to be different in the short run; nonetheless, 
there is a positive incentive for H to move if they are. This happens in the long run. Each 
mobile creative human capital owner is inclined to move into the region where his indirect 
utility is higher. Further assume that East and West are allowed to tax the wage-income of the 
creative human capital. The tax rate is t in the West ( * t  in the East). An incentive to move 
exists if the indirect utilities are 
 
(8)  * t t w w ¹   with       p w t t / ) 1 ( - = w     and      * / * *) 1 ( * p w t t - = w . 
 
However, as long as the difference between the indirect utility in West and East is too small to 
compensate for mobility costs, the mobile factor does not move. Figure 1a shows the so-
called wiggle curve - the quotient of indirect utilities (in this case for symmetrical taxation in 
both regions)  * / t t t w w = W  (like the current German situation) – for the agglomeration case, 
and it depicts the mobility costs as well. 
 
There are three possible long-run equilibria; two of them are stable. There is a stable one with 
the larger share of H in the West (point W) and another stable one with the larger share in the 
                                                 
7 See Baldwin et al. (2003). 
8  Note,  that  1 - <s m .  This  is  the  co-called  “no-black-hole”  condition.  It  prevents  agglomeration  forces 
overpowering dispersion forces already at the very beginning of economic integration getting a negative break 
point.   
   
East (point E). Common to both of them is that there is an incentive for the remaining mobile 
factors to move to the core as well, but these migrations are prevented by mobility costs. The 
third equilibrium is the symmetric solution point M (in the middle), where the indirect utility 
is the same in East and West. In the case of agglomeration when the slope of the wiggle curve 
is positive in M, the middle equilibrium is an unstable one, because the movement of any 
person is bound to start the agglomeration process. Having assumed symmetric regions, this 
third equilibrium is at  5 . 0 = H s . Stronger home preferences would make the curve of mobility 
costs  H f   steeper  and  cause  the  equilibria  W  and  E  to  shift  towards  the  middle  M. 
Agglomeration of H will decrease under these circumstances. 
 
figure 1a 
Illustration of the agglomeration case (case a: 75 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 5 . 2 , 5 . 0 = = = = l j s m ) 
 
The wiggle curve is dependent on the freeness of trade j . High trade barriers (or a low j ) 
are responsible for a negative slope of the wiggle curve at point M (as it is also produced by 
the standard tax competition models) (see the dashed line in figure 1, case b with  1 . 0 = j ). 
Freer trade (allowing for agglomeration) makes the graph look different again. At the so 
called “sustain point” of j  (which could be depicted only by plotting against j ) the wiggle 
curve changes its direction, from this j  onwards now increasing. For a certain range of j  the 
wiggle curve shows a minimum on the right side of M and a maximum on the left side. 
Agglomeration forces produce a positive slope at I and J (figure 1b; case c with  32 . 0 = j ). 
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further increase of j  makes the extreme values vanish and leads to the agglomeration case of 




The dispersion cases ( 32 . 0 : 1 . 0 : = = f j c case and b case ) 
 
The agglomeration process in the model is based on three different effects. The home-market 
effect enables firms to find more customers in the more crowded region. When persons are 
moving to the West, more potential customers will be accumulating. The share of expenditure 
in the West will be growing. This will boost the returns to H by increasing w. The rising 
number of firms in the West will be making products more heterogeneous and thus raising the 
living standard in the West. A growing share of M-products must be imported into the East 
which causes transport costs, making life relatively more expensive. This effect is called the 
cost-of-living  effect.  These  are  the  two  reasons  for  the  migration  of  the  creative  human 
capital. The migration is self-reinforcing, circular causation comes into play
10. In contrast to 
these  effects  there  is  only  the  local  competition  effect  acting  as  a  diversity  force.  The 
competition in the West will increase relative to the East. From an intermediate j  onwards, 
the first two effects will be much stronger than the last one and are able to cause considerable 
(and in the original Krugman world even total) agglomeration. 
 
                                                 
9 See Appendix A for a simulation of the parameters and the changes in outcome. Appendix B is a small extract 
of the table presented in Appendix A that is detailed enough to display the rather rare case c of figure 1b as well. 
10 In the model, the prices in the West will be lower than in the East, because the model disregards all kinds of 
local homogeneous non-tradable goods. The scarcity of these goods defeats the cost-of-living effect in reality. 
But it can be observed that many people prefer to live in the West, believing there is a better living standard 
despite higher prices for homogeneous non-tradable goods there. Thus, one can be confident that, nonetheless, 
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III.  The Case of Germany 
 
After  reunification  in  1990,  Eastern  Germany  was  suffering  from  a  considerable  lack  of 
productive capital. Akerlof et al. (1991) provide a useful survey showing the problems and the 
political shortcomings in those years. Rising wages and the overvalued exchange rate of the 
East German Mark were the pitfalls which led to high unemployment in Eastern Germany. 
Probably as a result, the convergence process of Eastern Germany stalled, the relative GDP of 
the East is stagnating at around 2/3 of the Western German level since 1996 (figure 2). One 
can observe a sizeable productivity gap between West and East, and unemployment rates are 
twice as high as in Western Germany. 
 
figure 2 
GDP and Private Consumption per Inhabitant in Eastern Germanv 
Arbeitskreis VGR der Länder (2005) 
 
Besides these problems of the productivity gap and of wages having been set above market 
clearing  level  –  a  fact  that  must  not  be  underestimated  in  its  consequences  on  Eastern 
Germanys  productivity  and  income  –  there  is  another  big  problem  to  deal  with.  Mass 
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net-migration is rising again since 1996. Eastern Germany has lost more than 10% of its 
population  to  the  West  (Burda/Hunt,  2001;  Statistisches  Bundesamt,  2005).  Although  the 
ongoing migration can not be associated with a huge brain drain, the young and the higher 
educated have been found to be more inclined to migrate relative to their weight in the total 
population (Kempe, 1999, 2001; OECD, 2001, p.136). Low skilled and older people, on the 
other hand, tend to stay. 
 
To this problem it must be added that, in general, East Germans believe in the responsibility 
of  the  state  and  favour  state  interventions  more  than  West  Germans  do.  Alesina/Fuchs-
Schündeln  (2005)  observe  a  significant  bias  in  preferences  of  West  German  inhabitants 
towards  a  market  regime  compared  to  the  East  Germans.  They  also  present  empirical 
evidence that younger people in Eastern Germany are less in favour of state intervention than 
older ones, and even the younger people who migrate to the West are less so than those who 
stay. The difference between West and East Germans is explained as a direct effect of the 
previous communist regime of the GDR. 
 
Statistically, the qualifications of the labour force in Eastern Germany are higher than in West 
Germany (Davies/Hallet, 2001). But before reunification, the East German education system 
stressed basic knowledge and vocational, largely technical skills. Creativity, diversity and 
ideologically unsafe topics were suppressed (Laporte/Schweizer, 1994). The result was a lack 
of managerial and marketing skills. This might have hampered the competitiveness of East 
German products.  The deficiency in special business skills in the East – especially the lack of 
managerial, marketing and organisational skills, some special kind of social human capital 
that determines successful entrepreneurs (we call it creative human capital) – is often blamed 
for the poor economic performance of firms in the East (OECD 2001; Burda/Hunt, 2001, 
p.63; Davies/Hallet, 2001). Without these skills, it is difficult to assess distribution channels 
and markets, to build a reputation and to establish brand names (Quehenberger, 2000). This is 
yielding less product heterogeneity and lower prices for comparable products in the East. 
Losing to the West just the young people with a positive attitude towards the market economy 
to the West will result in an additional problem for those staying in the East (Burda/Hunt, 
2001). 
 
There are several reasons for young people to emigrate. Uncertainty about the political future 
may have been a reason in 1990, but not today. On being asked, they put forward a higher  
   
income  (43%),  less  unemployment  (36%) and  a  better living-standard  in  the  West  (39%; 
including  a  greater  diversity  in  consumer  goods  for  their  leisure  time)
11.  Unemployment 
caused by wages above the market clearing level is surely a huge problem for the East, but it 
is not the aim here to focus on it
12. However, the other two reasons are important concerning 
the problem of mass emigration: Higher wages and a better living standard in the West. Both 
are  exactly  the  consequences  to  be  expected  accompanying  the  agglomeration  process  of 
creative young people as in the model presented. This is indeed pointing to agglomeration 
forces  at  work.  Note  that  a  better  living  standard  means  better  access  to  the  different 
heterogeneous products that young people want to consume. In terms of an agglomeration 
model, this is to be interpreted as a lower price level for heterogeneous products in the West. 
The living standard in the West is supposed to be higher. This appears to be paradoxical 
because living in the East is said to be cheaper. Anyway, the cheaper heterogeneous products 
that are available in the West obviously compensate the migrating Easterners for the general 
higher prices of many homogeneous products in the agglomerated areas of Western Germany. 
 
In an attempt to stem this pattern of migration, the German Government, the West German 
states and the EU have provided considerable amounts of transfers for the East, most of them 
via  the  social  security  system.  About  €  980  billions  have  been  sent  from  West  to  East 
Germany between 1991 and 2003 (see figure 3). This is the reason for the difference between 
production and consumption level in the East that appeared in figure 2. Being linked to the 
development of the wage level, the transfer income (unemployment benefits and pensions) 
increased as well. Household incomes have converged much more rapidly than GDP (Figure 
2). Today, public transfers account for nearly a third of the East German average income. 
 
More than € 800 billions cumulative investment has been made in the East (including private 
investment) from 1991 until 1998 (most of it in structures). However, capital per capita in the 
East is still far lower than in the West. Moreover, the Eastern German equipment investment 
per  capita  has  fallen  significantly  below  the  West  value  (Sinn/Westermann,  2001; 
Burda/Hunt, 2001). This indicates clearly that Germany’s convergence in terms of capital 
endowment has come to a halt. There are surely many reasons (German wage structure, wage 
inflexibility, industry density in the East, the decline of the construction sector), but all of 
                                                 
11 These figures have been identified by the Leipziger Institut für Marktforschung (2000) for the Mitteldeutsche 
Zeitung. Note that there was more than one answer possible. According to the same institute, in 2020 there will 
be only about 12 million people left living in the East, 2/3 of them already of retirement age. 
  
   
them were by no means new reasons in 1996 (when convergence stopped) and thus cannot 







After all, East German infrastructure endowment has shown strong growth and is now in 
some  respects  even  better  than  the  Western  German  one  (DIW  et  al.,  2003; 
Sachverständigenrat,   2005). The labour force is said to be well qualified (at least compared 
to the West). General human capital (measured in education) has good standards (Burda/Hunt, 
2001; Davies/Hallet, 2001). The workforce is expensive compared to other countries, but it is 
still cheaper than in the West. Adding to this the huge amounts of transfers and subsidies, one 
must wonder why the problems are not diminishing. In a region with conditions so similar to 
the West German ones and still lower wages, a further convergence should be observed.  
 
Taking this into account, the mass emigration of the young has to be seen not only as a result, 
but also as an important reason for the end of the convergence process. This emigration must 
be seen as the self-reinforcing inducement of the ongoing agglomeration process described in 
the model. The migration of creative human capital agglomerating in some West German 
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better living standard in the West attract the mobile people, and their agglomeration enlarges 
markets, raises wages and improves the living standard in the West.  
 
Observing that young people are agglomerating in the West, an increasing wiggle curve has to 
be assumed for the German case. M is (due to the assumed symmetry) always a point of the 
wiggle curve. It is possible to yield the result that  1 = H s , hence, the relative indirect utility 
t W is  H t f > W   (see  appendix  A).  In  this  case,  even  the  creative  person  with  the  highest 
preference for staying in the East will change region. All creative human capital would be 
leaving the East. No heterogeneous products will be produced there any longer. We cannot 
exclude this case because of the problems of measuring product heterogeneity. However, this 
scenario can be thought extremely unlikely already to have happened in Germany. Therefore, 
we assume a gently inclined wiggle curve and point W to describe the German case, being 
confident that the rising wiggle curve and the rising mobility costs are both close to what has 
happened to Germany. 
 
As an Easterner, you can get all western products as well, at least if you pay the money to 
travel. But quality of life is better in the West, and it is still very expensive to draw all that 
quality  into  an  Eastern  home.  On  the  other  side,  Germany  is  one  country  (without  trade 
barriers), and transportation costs are continuously falling. So the “freeness” should be rather 
high, j  is assumed as 
3
2
= j . The expenditure share  m  on M-goods is not low considering 
all the brand names (as a proxy for heterogeneous products) in Germany. But people are 
spending on (homogeneous) no-name-products as well. It depends on the definition of M-
goods and A-goods to estimate m . It is assumed here as  5 . 0 = m , l is assumed to be 1. 
 
The elasticity of substitution s between different varieties of M is the last missing parameter. 
Choosing  5 . 0 = m  and  3 / 2 = j , any  5 < s  will lead to partial agglomeration. The case is 
illustrated with  3 = s  (figure 4). Of course, it must be admitted that this simulation is just at 
the  beginning  and  far  from  using  it  to  make  any  numerical  deductions.  But  it  is  already 
sufficient to outline the general problem of the German case and to provide a basic pattern for 




   
figure 4 
The German Case 
 
Not only the migration of people, but also the movement of capital can create agglomerative 
forces even if the profits are repatriated. There will be no self-reinforcing effects if capital 
owners stay at home. But supposing more expenditure (because of more inhabitants) in one 
region, one can show that for an intermediate value of j  mobile capital per capita will be 
distributed  unevenly  across  the  nation  (Martin/Rodgers,  1995).  The  reason  is  the  market-
access effect. It must be assumed that in case of an agglomeration of consumers (via the 
agglomeration of creative human capital) in the West capital is bound to agglomerate there as 
well. It seems to be straightforward to suggest that the lack of capital in Eastern Germany 
could partly be explained in this way, but we cannot provide more evidence. 
 
Another force to make the agglomeration effects even stronger is based on the so-called “race 
to the bottom” theory. Having the same tax rate for each kind of factor income in each region, 
this theory draws the conclusion that people will be spread evenly across the nation. But 
considering agglomeration effects, it is to observe that there is a growing share of consumers 
in the West. The West can produce more local public goods than the East, because the tax 
revenue in the West is higher. This is a further incentive for Eastern people to migrate – even 
for  the  (in  the  model  immobile)  workforce  and  not  only  for  the  creative  human  capital. 
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IV.  How can the East get help to help itself? 
 
The central question is whether and how the East could help itself. Bear in mind that any help 
for the East will not lead to a pareto-improvement for Germany as a whole. We have not 
discussed any possible market failure, and taking into account the efficiency gains resulting 
from free individual choices of the location, we do not believe it to be of a significant impact. 
So any measure to help the East is considered only from the viewpoint of Eastern Germany. 
 
Only few policy recommendations can be justified on the grounds of the New Economic 
Geography.  Investments  in  the  infrastructure  in  order  to  connect  regions  is  one  of  them, 
working by lowering j . In the long run, this is a very promising recommendation, but at first 
it is not unlikely to force further agglomeration. In fact, a better access to the West could raise 
mobility and empty the East even faster (Martin, 1999). More investments in intraregional 
infrastructure or raising subsidies in the East will work as well. However, they have to be 
financed by a central government. Another suggestion is about spending in the education of 
the Eastern workforce. Here we face the same budget problem: Additional tax revenues were 
necessary to finance this. And the well-taught creative human capital can be expected to leave 
the East immediately after its education. As we have not discussed any market failure, we 
cannot give an advice on this idea. Setting up beacons by favouring local industry clusters 
with subsidies are another often suggested alternative of helping the East, but they are also not 
the issue here, because there are no technological externalities assumed and discussed.  
 
The East has to do more for the people prone to leaving. But for this, the Eastern German 
states should be allowed to use every political instrument that may help themselves. Tax rate 
setting is one of the most important ones. The East must be permitted to impose lower tax 
rates on the persons whose emigration is the direct reason of the East’s problems, hence on 
the creative human capital. The ones, who are otherwise leaving the East, have to be retained 
by lower tax rates, or Germany will get the results of a “race to the bottom”. Reducing the tax 
rate in the East slightly (the dotted line in figure 5 with the tax difference T*) can already shift 
W to W* while attracting some H. A few entrepreneurs will move back home, despite having 
strong agglomeration forces. This will lower  t W  for all entrepreneurs in the West. The first 
important result thus is that even a marginal tax difference between East and West can already  
   
help the East
13. As one can see, the share of creative human capital in the East  * H s  will rise 
( H s  will fall) with each marginal tax rate decline there. Graphically, this is caused by shifting 
the wiggle curve downwards.  t W diminishes due to the different tax rates. 
 
figure 5 
Different tax rates in East and West 
 
The “break point” tax rate for the East to get the core cannot really be expressed in numbers, 
because we are not able to give even a rough estimate of the underlying parameters. Working 
with  5 . 0 3 , 4 . 0 , 6 . 0 = = = = l s m j and , you can observe a share of more than 0.7 in 
the West – a significant agglomeration (point W). But a tax rate difference of just one percent 
point (T**) is already enough to change the picture completely for the East to attract the core. 




The new wiggle curve (the chain dotted line) is located below the home preference curve (the 
dotted curve), thus leading to an immediate run home. Because of the tax difference, this run 
does not stop at  5 . 0 = H s , but at a partial agglomeration of H  in the East (Point E**). This is 
                                                 
13 This result is a new one: Ludema/Wooton (2000) and Baldwin/Krugman (2004) also examine,  how tax 
competition works under agglomeration forces. But their agglomeration forces can create catastrophic results 
only.  In  this  case,  marginal  reforms  are  not  helping.  Bork/Pflüger  (2004)  analyse  this  case,  too.  But 
unrealistically, they show it with identical agglomeration rents in East and West. 
14 See for other parameters again appendix A. Tax rates that would change the direction of agglomeration are 
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a  result  similar  to  Baldwin/Krugman  (2004)  who,  however,  would  obtain  a  complete 
agglomeration in the East. They put forward tax competition while setting a tax floor. Indeed, 
a tax floor could be a good idea to prevent the West from becoming the new periphery as a 
result of the tax competition.  Our main conclusion is that in the case of partial agglomeration 
because of home preferences (as given in the case of Germany) any tax rate difference with a 
lower tax rate in the East does help the East to attract the mobile factor that the Eastern states 
urgently need. But on the other hand, this is risky: If the difference of tax rates is too large, a 
self-reinforcing agglomeration process can be created, directing all the mobile creative human 
capital into the East. 
 
The most important results of the German Case are as follows: 
·  Firstly, there will be a core and there will be a periphery. It is not possible (or much to 
costly) to prevent that from happening.  5 . 0 = H s  will never be a stable equilibrium, if 
agglomeration forces are at work. Politics have to take that into account. Either the 
East or the West will be poorer. 
·  Taking all measures to make the East better off, this can end up with the core in the 
East. European help for Ireland is a good example that this is not only a hypothetical 
idea. If the complete convergence of the poorer region can be achieved, it is very 
likely to get a new core there. 
·  When  never  getting  the  dispersed  outcome,  policy  measures  should  try  at  best  to 
prevent (if they should at all), that the East will be empty in 30 years. 
·  Lastly, and this is not a surprise: Lowering marginal tax rates in the East will succeed, 
however, at the beginning the improvement is only marginal. Most authors of the New 
Economic Geography would deny that improvement, but under mobility constraints it 
is likely to get this result.  
·  It is not  possible to reverse the agglomeration process making marginal reforms only. 
Assuming that the next generation is more willing to emigrate than the current one, 
this will drive the agglomeration process further. Marginal Reforms are not sufficient 





   
V.  Policy Implications 
 
The first advice to any politician who is thinking about how to help the East is that he has to 
accept the core/periphery pattern. If the central German government wants to affect it, it has 
to spend huge amounts of transfers and subsidies – year by year (as long as  1 < j ). To attract 
more  industry,  the  East  needs  a  few  specific  factors  that  are  agglomerated  in  the  West 
(entrepreneurship,  market  behaviour,  marketing  skills).  Hence,  it  has  to  attract  the  right 
people – or, it must at least retain its own creative human capital. 
 
The same tax rate for creative human capital in East and West is too high for the East to 
compete. If the East imposed a somewhat lower tax rate, there would be a competition effect 
on  the  West.  Lowering  the  tax  rate  only  marginally,  this  competition  may  not  be  very 
sensible. The core will be staying in the West. But larger differences in tax rates can cause the 
core to change. To make sure there will be no complete shift to the East (this seems unfair as 
long as the West is co-financing this), it is possible to set a tax floor. The purpose of tax 
competition in this case is not to gain more efficiency, but to avoid too much and politically 
not accepted agglomeration in the East. Nevertheless, more efficiency is to be expected from 
competition as well. 
 
To  match  the  living  standard  of  the  West  the  East  needs  further  help.  The  East  will  be 
remaining  the  periphery,  and  without  the  transfers  Eastern  Germans  cannot  win  in  a  tax 
competition. Lowering the transfers will make the wiggle curve steeper yet, what can drive 
the agglomeration process further and leave behind a poorer and emptier East. The advice to 
lower taxes is not bound to bring an efficiency gain for Germany as a whole, it is only to help 
the East. One important objection that can be raised is that the East is poorer even when 
obtaining transfers. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the East is able to lower its tax rates. This 
objection is not wrong. However, the East does obviously not need to lower all its tax rates. 
The income tax rate for creative human capital is the one to be reduced. As an example, the 
Eastern German Länder could be allowed to impose their own age-dependent income tax 
rates. Thereby, it is not necessary to reduce all the tax rates in the East. Maybe a reduction of 
only a few percentage points of the income tax rates for young people with an income above 
the  average  will already  be  enough.  The  increasing  market  size in  the  East  will  soon  be 
attracting more creative human capital, more young people and – via the market access effect 
– more consumers and more physical capital as well.  
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σ 2 2 2 3 3 3
µ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6
 φ
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive s=1; t>0,1 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive s=1; t>0.03 s=1; t>0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.6; t>0.01
 λ=0.5 0.6 s>0.5 s=1; t>0.05 s=1; t>0.2 neg dispersive s>0.6; t>0.01 s=1; t>0.03
0.8 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.9; t>0.02 s=1; t>0.05 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.8; t>0.02
0.9 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.7; t>0.01 s>0.8; t>0.02 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.6; t>0.01
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive s=1; t>0.1 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive s>0.7; t>0.01 s=1; t>0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5
 λ=1 0.6 s>0.5 s>0.8; t>0.02 s=1; t>0.1 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.7; t>0.01
0.8 s>0.5 s>0.7; t>0.01 s>0.8; t>0.02 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01
0.9 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.8; t>0.02 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive s>0.6; t>0.01 s=1; t>0.1 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5
 λ=1.5 0.6 s>0.5 s>0.7; t>0.02 s=1; t>0.05 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01
0.8 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.7; t>0.02 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01
0.9 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5
σ 4 4 4 5 5 5
µ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6
 φ
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=0.5 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.6; t>0.01 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5
0.8 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.7; t>0.01 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01
0.9 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=1 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5
0.8 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.6; t>0.01 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5
0.9 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=1.5 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5
0.8 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5
0.9 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 s>0.5 











σ 10 10 10 15 15 15
µ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6
 φ
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=0.5 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.8 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.9 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=1 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.8 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.9 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=1.5 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.8 neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.9 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.5
σ 25 25 25
µ 0.2 0.4 0.6
 φ
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=0.5 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.8 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.9 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=1 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.8 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.9 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.4 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
 λ=1.5 0.6 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.8 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive
0.9 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive 
   
neg dispersive           negative  slope  of  the  wiggle 
curve at M 
M  is  stable  (no 
agglomeration); 
s > 0,5                  positive slope of the wiggle curve 
at M 
share  of  creative  human 
capital  is  slightly  larger  than 
0.5, but smaller than 0.6  
s > 0.6  positive slope of the wiggle curve 
at M 
share  of  creative  human 
capital  is  slightly  larger  than 
0.6, but smaller than 0.7  
s = 1  positive slope of the wiggle curve 
at M 
complete agglomeration in the 
West 
t>0,01  Any difference of more than one 
percentage  point  would  be 
sufficient to change the direction 
of agglomeration. Remind, that as 
long  as  the  East  shows 
agglomeration advantages and tax 
rate  advantages,  the 
agglomeration  in  the  East  is 
higher  than  the  previous  one  in 
the  West  (due  to  the  additional 
tax rate advantage)  
 
For the reason of simplification, 
   the values margin of s (share of creative human capital) is  
   s Î (0,5; 0,6; 0,7; 0,8; 0,9; 1) 













σ 2 2 2 2 2 2
µ 0.2 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.4 0.6
 φ
0.2 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive s=1
0.3 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive s>0.5 s=1
0.33 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive case c s>0.8 s=1
 λ=0.5 0.35 neg dispersive neg dispersive neg dispersive case c s>0.9 s=1
0.4 neg dispersive s>0.5 s>0.6 s>0.7 s=1 s=1
0.6 s>0.5 s>0.9 s>0.9 s=1 s=1 s=1
0.8 s>0.6 s>0.8 s>0.8 s>0.8 s>0.9 s=1
0.9 s>0.6 s>0.6 s>0.6 s>0.6 s>0.7 s>0.8 
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